400 MPs

Since both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat manifestos contained proposals to reduce the number of MPs to 400 there is a real danger that this measure will go ahead. From the Liberal Democrat point of view this is a great mistake.

One of the few disadvantages of the Single Transferable Vote method of PR, our preferred option, is that the multi-member constitutes can be very large in sparsely populated areas such as the north of Scotland. This problem will be exacerbated if the number of MPs is reduced.

Clearly there was a lack of "joined up thinking" here by Liberal Democrat policy makers. What is more important: a "symbolic" cost-saving measure as a knee-jerk reaction to the expenses scandal or the basic requirement to facilitate the only electoral system which will genuinely transform our politics?

Against the odds, I hope this proposal will be quietly forgotten.

That 55%

I cannot understand all the huffing and puffing from senior Labour figures and some constitutional pundits about the proposal that the five year fixed term of future parliaments should not be curtailed unless 55%, rather than a simple majority of MPs, vote for it. It seems reasonable to assume that a major change, such as the highly desirable move to a fixed term for parliaments, should involve other consequential adjustments. If the prime minister is no longer able to bully his critics into line by the threat of a dissolution (or, strictly speaking, asking the monarch for a dissolution) than smaller parties, or even individual MPs, should not be able to blackmail an administration by a similar threat.

I believe that in Scotland, which also has fixed term parliaments, the barrier is set at 66%. Compared with this 55% seems modest. The rule would not mean that a government defeated by only one vote would necessarily remain in office. Theoretically the government so defeated would resign and the monarch would invite another leader, or maybe even the same leader, to try to form an administration with a different composition which could command the support of the existing parliament. It would be interesting to see these circumstances tested in practice before such rules are codified in a written constitution (which doesn't, at the moment, appear to be on the agenda)

In the event of deadlock, without a written constitution with safeguards requiring a higher majority for constitutional changes, there would be nothing to stop a parliament overturning the 55% rule by a simple majority, and then the prime minister asking for a premature dissolution.