The Border and the Backstop

On the final pages of his detailed "Legacy of a Century of Irish Politics" Irish historian Diarmaid Ferriter writes:

[The] draft agreement on British withdrawal from the EU . . included a protocol relating to Northern Ireland  covering a backstop - in the even t of the EU and  UK failing to agree  to  their future relationships  by 31st December 2020 - to avoid a hard border in Ireland.  This detailed that in the absence of a future deal, the whole of the UK  would stay aligned with the EU customs union instead of just a specific rule applying to Northern Ireland  as originally proposed.  The UK also agreed under he terms of this new backstop that Northern Ireland would remain aligned with a limited set of rules relating to the EU's single market.

I've quoted this in full as I'm not sure that many of us know precisely what the backstop is, although we've heard it talked about a  lot.

Ferriter goes on:

In response UK Brexit Secretary Dominic Raab resigned and in his resignation letter complained  that the agreement compromised the 'integrity' of the UK  by indicating that Northern Ireland need special arrangements in relation to post-Brexit trade.  This plaintiveness about the purity of the UK and distaste for specific arrangements for Northern Ireland  flew in the face of the history  of Northern Ireland and the British, Irish and European relationships with it.

Ferriter does not here spell it out, but the "specific arrangements" for Northern Ireland within the UK incudes a continued ban on abortions an same sex marriages, some 20 to 25 per cent of its GDP coming from transfers from the UK Exchequer (lots more than we get in Yorkshire) and, wait for it, proportional representation by single transferable vote in multi-member constituencies.

Ferriter than claims:

Despite Raab's  assertions the reality was  that Brexiteers  who offered no coherent  alternative to the draft agreement, did not cherish Northern Ireland; rather it was a convenient  tactic  employed in a distinctly English power game  which also saw them cheering on the DUP in its trenchant opposition to the draft agreement.

And finally, the killer analogy:

There was an element of history repeating itself, with some British Conservatives insisting on 'an extreme and dangerous strategy as they had done  in encouraging Ulster rebellion  against home rule  from 1910 to 1914 to try and gain the upper hand  in domestic politics  rather than because of a passion for Ireland.

 This last is a reference to "Curragh Incident" of 20 March 1914, when British Army officers threatened to resign or accept dismissal (ie Mutiny) rather than deploy against the Ulster Volunteers, forcing the government to cancel planned troop movements.

So the Tories have a history of stopping at nothing, including urging to army to mutiny, in order to gain their ends.

Plus ça change . . .